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Abstract 
The Australian Federal Government has responded to the 
projected, adverse economic repercussions of an ageing 
population with pronatalist, family-friendly tax 
incentives, policy rhetoric, and a lump sum Baby Bonus1. 
Tangentially, amid circulation of birth-dearth 
predictions, the media is positioning fertility as a 
precious, personal asset not to be squandered. Women in 
Australia are being subjected to a synergism of new - or 
renewed - societal forces to “procreate and cherish” that 
may have unintended consequences on the most 
vulnerable: newly-pubescent, adolescent women2. 
Introduction 
As governments grapple with projections of 
plummeting populations, a phenomenon set to emerge 
without intervention within fifty years, each nation’s 
total fertility rate (TFR) is becoming a ‘Dow Jones’ 
futures index of the viability of its economy. 
Demographers warn that decline of the future labour 
force and escalation of ageing populations will be 
immanent sources of deep strain on all global 
economies, both in the developed and developing 
worlds, unable to be addressed adequately by 
immigration. Just-in-time production takes on a new 
realm of meaning as birth-dearth predictions circulate. 
Paradoxically, while increasing rather than decreasing 
populations contribute to resource strain and ecological 
impacts, and with projections of the global population 
reaching nine billion inhabitants by 2030, Australia and 
other OECD nations are attempting to boost fertility in 
the interests of future economies.  
How can these two sets of contradictory messages be 
reconciled? On the one hand, the world is already 
overpopulated, according to the ecologists (Huggins & 
Skandera, 2005), and on the other, the Federal 
Government is advocating that Australia needs more 
children. Thus, enhanced receptiveness to procreation 
                                                 
1 The Baby Bonus payment for each newborn paid to 
the birth mother was introduced in July 2004 as $3000, 
increased to $4000 in July 2006, set to increase to 
$5000 in July 2008.  
2 Adolescents are taken to be 12 to 19 years-of-age, and 
the oxymoron of ‘adolescent women’ is deliberately 
chosen.  
must enter the collective consciousness, to change the 
hard-wired, over-population messages of the past forty 
years, and to push against ecological alarm, if the 
downward trend of fertility is to be steadied, if not 
reversed. For the TFR to increase from its present 1.83 
to the (apparently3) preferable replacement level of 
2.06, seduction of the national psyche to procreate is via 
the public purse. In tandem, the average age of a 
woman bearing her first child would need to decrease, 
because the older she is when her first child arrives, the 
less likely she will (be able to) have the all-important, 
third child who, demographers say, is ‘the important 
child as far as fertility policy is concerned’ (McDonald, 
2002)4. Such societal messages will affect, indubitably, 
newly-pubescent females and their attitudes toward 
potentialising motherhood. 
 
Pronatalist rhetoric 
Articulation of pronatalism began in Australia in 2001. 
Heard (2006) identifies its commencement as an almost 
buried aside in Prime Minister Howard’s Federal 
Liberal Party campaign launch in October 2001, when 
he announced the First Child Tax Refund (the original 
baby bonus): ‘assistance with family formation is very 
much in Australia’s long term interests’. Since then, 
from Heard’s timeline tracking of the development of 
pronatalism under Howard, the rhetoric of, first, gender 
equity theory and, then, preference theory surrounding 
the pronatalist agenda has softened the sensitive matters 
of the ‘government-in-the-bedroom’ and social 
engineering, so successfully that the carefully worded 
Intergenerational Report, released on the occasion of 
the Federal Budget 2002-03 (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2002), aroused no quarrel in the press. 
Phrases such as ‘emerging issues associated with an 
ageing population’, and ‘fiscal outlook over the long 
term’ were becoming more acceptable. Momentum 
gathered from the Federal Budget of July 2004 onward, 
                                                 
3 See Huggins and Skandera (2005), Population puzzle: 
Boom or bust? for other demographic models and 
theory. 
4  Australia does not have a population or pronatalist 
policy, ‘in the strict sense,’ says McDonald (2003). 
Jackson (2006) says otherwise, that Australia has an 
‘explicit fertility policy in the form of a Maternity 
Payment.’ 
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strengthened by the Federal Treasurer’s oft-quoted 
exhortation, ‘have one for your husband and one for 
your wife and one for the country’. In effect, 
Australians were being stimulated to reproduce with a 
sense of national pride, and being prepared to accept the 
new ideal: the three child family. 
 
Policies That Promote Birth Rate Increase  
As has been established by research conducted by the 
Australian Institute of Family Studies (Weston, Qu, 
Parker, & Alexander, 2004), the majority of Australians 
aged 20-39 years, anticipating or already involved in 
parenthood, aspire to have three children, although, in 
reality, they are more likely to have two. For conditions 
for third-child aspirations to be realisable, the Federal 
Government needed new discussions with Australian 
families, to push against what Wattenberg (2004) dubs 
as a “near-Copernican shift” in procreation ideology. 
Governments seeking to break from over forty years of 
persistent alarm about overpopulation will encounter ‘a 
very powerful set of objections’ to policies that promote 
an increase in the birth rate (McDonald, 2006).  
Thus, the pursuit of a long-range vision has been met 
with considerable resistance: in revising family tax 
benefits, the Australian Government has received 
criticism5; in repudiating universal, paid maternity 
leave, it has been found wanting6; and in attending to 
more childcare centre placements, although part way 
addressed, it has faced controversy7. The one “vote 
winner”8 is a direct cash transfer to mothers of 
newborns, a “policy which scores highly. Because of its 
directness”, McDonald (2006) believes, it “strongly 
affirms that society values children”, not only 
financially but also symbolically. Yet this payment, too, 
carries a burden. Its utilitarianism may have unintended 
consequences: the powerful message being made by the 
                                                 
5 The Howard Government ‘has used the financial carrot of 
the Baby Bonus and Family Tax Benefit Part B to entice 
women from the workforce, and the financial stick of Family 
Benefit Part A and the Childcare Benefit (CCB) to penalise 
women who stay in full-time employment’ (Summers, 2003). 
6 Then Minister for Employment and Workplace 
Relations, Tony Abbott, claimed that a compulsory, 
universal paid maternity leave system would be adopted 
‘over this government’s dead body, frankly, it just 
won’t happen under this Government’ (Radio National, 
2002). 
7 ‘It’s a myth child care is hard to find and too 
expensive, a new federal Treasury analysis says’ 
(Colebatch, 2006). 
8 The Nicholson cartoon in The Australian on July 1, 
2004 depicted Federal Treasurer Costello in a hospital 
bed, ‘giving birth’ to the Baby Bonus, with Prime 
Minister Howard’s words as the caption, 
‘Congratulations! It’s a vote winner!’ 
Baby Bonus may be received by “the wrong people” 
(McDonald), which includes teenage girls internalising 
messages meant for their (much) older sisters. 
 
Importance of Age at First Childbearing 
McDonald (2002) describes the psychological threshold 
of having the first child as the highest, because ‘a high 
proportion of the indirect cost of having children comes 
with the first child’. The first child is, in terms of 
family, the most important movement over the 
threshold into the higher status of parenthood, and the 
motivator for a possible second. Australian family 
culture is less than enthusiastic about an only child, 
desiring the ideal of a sibling for the first child and, a 
further ideal, one of each sex (Kippen, Gray, & Evans, 
2005). But it is the third child that most interests many 
demographers, with studies of third-child capacity 
especially prevalent in recent demographic literature 
(Hoem, Prskawetz, & Neyer, 2002). For families to 
have that third child, the decision invariably rests with 
female age at first childbirth. 
Carmichael and McDonald (2003) offer a vital 
consideration: ‘age at the commencement of child-
bearing is a major determinant of ultimate family size’. 
Support for this position comes from an average-age-at-
first-birth comparison: women born between 1908 and 
1912 in Australia had their first birth, on average, at 
26.4 years old; women born between 1933 and 1937 
had an average age for first birth of 23.3 years old (the 
youngest of the century), a cohort which reached the 
highest completed fertility rate (3.0) for any cohort of 
the 20th century. That the peak in cohort fertility was 
achieved by the youngest-average-age-at-first-birth 
group ‘is not without significance. This calculation 
supports an argument that age at the commencement of 
childbearing is a major determinant of ultimate family 
size’ (Carmichael & McDonald). Rephrased, ‘when 
women have their first child in their 30s, the time left to 
have other children is cut by half relative to those who 
had their first children in their 20s’ (D’addio & 
d’Ercole, 2005). In other words, the earlier a woman 
has her first child, the more likely it is that she will go 
onto having not just a second, but possibly a third child.  
How to address the threshold impediment 
successfully is integrated through two dimensions: the 
Howard Coalition Government’s approach toward that 
‘barbecue stopper’, the work/life balance and family-
friendly policies (politically-canny speak for 
pronatalism), and the popular press. Fertility has been 
positioned more strenuously in the media recently, as a 
limited resource ebbing with (female) age, exhorted as a 
precious, personal asset not to be squandered. The 
hourglass with the sands of the fertility window 
trickling away replaces the biological clock ticking. A 
synergism of imperatives slides into position, resting 
roundly on women’s shoulders: the earlier she has her 
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first babe, the more fortunate she will be, a misty 
message, indeed, for a newly-pubescent girl.  
 
A Particularly ‘Wicked Problem’ 
Bridgman and Davis (2004) draw on the term “wicked 
problem”, a 1973 coinage by Rittel and Weber, to 
describe “those issues that cannot be settled and will not 
go away … Much of social and economic policy is 
about managing (but not solving) wicked problems”. 
Bridgman and Davis provide a synopsis of a particular - 
and particularly – “wicked problem”: 
The federal government has been grappling with the 
complexities of what John Howard has called “the 
biggest social debate of our time”. The objectives of 
the “work and family” policy package are to allow 
families to combine caring for children and paid work 
and, on a broader scale, to arrest the decline in 
Australia’s birthrate … Both sides of politics 
acknowledge the complex nature of the problem … 
Work and family policy is an area in which clarity of 
objectives and confidence in policy instruments are 
hard to achieve. 
Governments prefer incremental solutions, when an 
existing response to a problem is modified, thus saving 
an entire policy cycle and capitalising on previous work 
(Bridgman & Davis, 2004). 
The Baby Bonus falls into this category. Introduced 
in 2001, the pre-existing baby bonus with its 
cumbersome conditions “was quietly abolished in the 
2004 budget and replaced with a more generous 
maternity payment”, observes Megalogenis (2007). 
“The baby bonus flopped”, he adds, “because the stay-
at-home mothers it was aimed at didn’t exist in the 
numbers that Howard’s advisors thought when the 
policy was being drawn up. The error rate was about 50 
per cent.” The revamped baby bonus in 2004 officially 
became the “maternity allowance” or, sometimes, the 
“newborn maternity payment” but, to add confusion, 
has since been popularly adopted in the capitalised form 
as the Baby Bonus, an incremental solution that masked 
a social policy mistake with recycled nomenclature.  
 
The Baby Bonus 
In the package of Australia’s pronatalist incentives to 
boost the TFR, the centrepiece is the Baby Bonus. The 
lump sum Baby Bonus, a procreation incentive that 
O’Donnell (2004) attributes to the “peculiar genius of 
Howard and Costello”, and Megalogenis (2007) to the 
“Prime Minister’s clairvoyant-like ability to pick which 
button to press on the electorate’s cash register”, is the 
only payment exactly of its kind. Paid directly to the 
mother for each newborn as a lump sum, unconditional 
payment, some commentators at the payment’s 
inception questioned its intended effectiveness as 
incentive enough to have a baby. One was that “the 
Maternity Payment would have to be at least ten times 
higher before it would affect fertility rates” (Hakim, 
cited in Morehead, 2004). Another pundit dismissed the 
possibility that “teenage girls will have babies to claim 
the Maternity Payment”, with some seeming relevance 
in the additional comment, that “only one hundred 14-
year-olds had babies in 2002” (Arndt, cited in 
Morehead)9. 
Public alarm, however, sounded loudly over the 
potential creation of yet more welfare-dependent, 
single, teenage mothers, a less-than-desirable corollary 
of the new promotion of parenthood. Responding to a 
spate of anguish-laden newspaper articles following the 
2004 budget release, Prime Minister Howard placated 
community angst over teenage girls who might be 
tempted to internalise messages meant for their older 
sisters (Maiden, 2004). Teen motherhood has been, 
after all, the lowest in Australia since first recorded by 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) in 1921, 
peaking in 1971 at 55.5 live births per 1,000 females 
15-19 (which includes births to mothers under 15 
years), down to 16.3 per 1,000 in 2004. But the impact 
of the new population policy on adolescent women was 
not so blithely brushed to one side, at least not by 
Plumpton High School principal Glenn Sergeant, who 
reacted strongly: “You put $3000 in anybody’s hands 
who’s not used to having any money whatsoever … 
unfortunately it’s enough money to induce some 
teenage girls to have a baby” (cited in Price, 2004)10. 
McDonald (2006) assesses that such “objections have 
faded with time”, but with the Baby Bonus due to 
increase again to $5000 in 2008, and with the 
influences of pronatalism rippling through the nation, 
sociological impact studies are indicated. 
Skepticism that such a payment could turn the heads 
of teenagers or anyone else toward (the contemplation 
of) parenthood is strong. Asks Heard (2006), “is there 
any theoretical and/or empirical basis for believing that 
a one-off payment can induce couples to consider an 
extra child or children?” Even Federal Treasurer 
Costello (2006), while taking credit for the Baby 
Bonus, his “little bit of labour” to help boost the TFR 
along with his advocacy to “procreate and cherish”, at 
the same time contradicted himself: “nobody would get 
pregnant for a $4000 payment”. Guest (2007) asks, “Do 
we need a pronatalist policy in Australia? Will the Baby 
Bonus raise fertility? Is the Baby Bonus a good 
                                                 
9 In 2005, 374 Australian mothers were under 16, 902 aged 
16, 1,947 aged 17, 2,993 aged 18 and 4,528 aged 19, a total of 
10,744 or 4.15% of all births (ABS, 2006).  
10 Plumpton High School in Melbourne was one of the 
few secondary schools in Australia with a young 
parents’ school program in Australia in 2004, a program 
for which Principal Sergeant received a Queen’s 
Birthday Honour in 2004. 
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pronatalist policy?”, and finds for the negative on each 
question amid pessimism about the Federal Coalition 
Government’s dogmatic pursuit to increase the TFR. 
Yet the proposition that such a payment has 
considerable power, as much symbolic as financial, can 
be supported. 
Firstly, in October 2006, controversy flared over 
unsubstantiated claims that “children are having 
children for the sake of the [Baby Bonus] payment” 
(Grace, 2006). A heated exchange in the press between 
politicians followed, resulting in a call to “increase 
scrutiny to stop baby bonus abuse” (Schubert, 2006). 
Response to this politically-sensitive issue came shortly 
after when Prime Minister Howard announced changes 
to the Baby Bonus payment conditions for mothers 
under 18 years old. His oblique rationale, that the 
decision was “common sense and [that] most of 
Australia would understand why we’re doing it” (The 
Australian, November 13, 2006), produced another 
spate of headlines. No empirical evidence was offered, 
yet a conclusion can be drawn that the lump sum mode 
of delivery was influential and detrimental enough for 
some young women that a prime ministerial response to 
nip criticism and avert the potential of misuse was 
required. The Baby Bonus has a new, fixed age limit: 
from July 2007, under 18-year-old mothers receive their 
payment as 13 fortnightly payments (which was the 
case for under 16-year-old mothers all along, at the 
discretion of the Centrelink government case worker).  
Secondly, McDonald (2006) cites early data from the 
Australian experience, that since the introduction of the 
Baby Bonus payment (and family tax incentives), ‘in 
the first quarter in which births could have been 
affected by the new payment (June Quarter, 2005), 
there was an increase of 10 per cent in the number of 
births compared to the same quarter in the preceding 
year’. Jackson (2006) challenges such grandiose – and 
from her calculations, misleading – claims, and 
‘cautions against complacency that declining fertility 
has been permanently arrested’. As Couch, Dowsett, 
Dutertre, Keys, and Pitts (2006) acknowledge, ‘few 
studies can ‘prove’ links between broad social and 
contextual factors [although] … there are studies that 
‘prove’ some of the varied steps along the way”, the 
province of sociologists and economists. 
The third and most compelling consideration to 
mitigate the understandable skepticism that one-off 
payments can lead people into the long term 
commitment of parenting comes from Milligan (2005) 
who finds an economic relationship between 
pronatalist, financial incentives, and birth outcomes. He 
reviews impact studies of financial enticement on 
fertility across 28 of the 30 OECD countries providing 
some form of special social policy for families. Using 
Quebec as a case study, Milligan (2002, 2005) found a 
25 per cent increase in fertility for families entitled to 
the full benefit. Further, Milligan calculates the cash 
payment scheme, then the equivalent of $A535 for the 
first child, (ultimately) $A1070 for the second, and 
$A8,550 for the third, as responsible for contributing 
93,000 additional births to Quebec in the eight years of 
the scheme’s existence. Schemes in other OECD 
countries, using what Demeny (2004) calls a “familiar 
armamentarium of pronatalist welfare State measures”, 
include cash payments, mostly weighted as incentive 
for the all-important, third child, an expensive budget 
item if such payments are fallible, or even unnecessary, 
at least for Australia, as Guest (2007) surmises. 
Conclusion 
Whether or not the Federal Government’s package of 
pronatalist incentives do boost the TFR to a level 
commensurate with the projected needs of an ageing 
population, and, indeed, whether or not this is 
ultimately necessary, some (unintended) consequences 
are likely, particularly the favourable impression that 
young(er) motherhood has society’s sanction. As 
McDonald and Kippen (2007) predict, “It may turn out 
that Australian women begin to have their children at 
somewhat younger ages than has been the case in the 
recent past”. Cater and Coleman (2006), in their UK 
study of ‘planned’ teenage pregnancy, refer to “the 
seemingly rational and positive decision of choosing the 
new life-course of parenthood [that] … challenges the 
stereotypical viewpoint of teenage pregnancy as a 
solely negative life-choice”. Pushing against the 
stereotype of the teenage, welfare mother, a new 
interpretation of mutual obligation11 can be proposed: 
while the State may be supporting her, she is 
contributing to raising the TFR on two counts: for the 
first child who made her into a teenage mother, and for 
her positioning by merit of her young age to be able to 
have that third child. A lowering of the average age of 
first time motherhood in Australia is one possible 
legacy of utilitarian policy, but the more concerning 
legacy is the emergence of a cohort of mothers much 
younger than most would find acceptable. 
 
 
Marilyn Anderson’s current research, The Amber Light 
Project, is the assessment of effects of pronatalist, 
national policies on adolescent women in Australia  
                                                 
11 Australia’s Mutual Obligation policy, in place since 
1998, requires anyone receiving income support over 
18 to meet additional activity test requirements 
(Centrelink, 2007).  
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